

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado



The Next Peace Operation: U.S. Air Force Issues and Perspectives

William C. Thomas
and
Jeremy D. Cukierman

May 1999

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**THE NEXT PEACE OPERATION:
U.S. AIR FORCE ISSUES AND
PERSPECTIVES**

William C. Thomas and Jeremy D. Cukierma

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FOREWORD


We are pleased to publish this twenty-fifth volume in the *Occasional Paper* series of the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). The United States faces an uneasy period of transition advancing into the post-Cold War era, and frequent involvement in the broad array of peace operations and other operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum has become a central task for the U.S. military. Because of our essential lift, humanitarian relief, and communications and command and control capabilities, the USAF is involved in these operations virtually every time the U.S. government commits its support. Further, U.S. airpower is a primary, if not *the* primary, instrument of choice for enforcing sanctions and seeking military leverage in support of political objectives in many of these situations. For all of these reasons, this is an important and timely paper that deserves careful consideration in planning and conducting USAF missions in support of peace operations.

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy. Our other sponsors currently include the Air Staff's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI); the Secretary of Defense's Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (incorporating the sponsorship of the Defense Special Weapons Agency and the On-Site Inspection Agency); the Army Environmental Policy Institute; the Plans Directorate of the United States Space Command; and the Air Force long-range plans

directorate (XPXP). The mission of the Institute is “to promote national security research for the Department of Defense within the military academic community, and to support the Air Force national security education program.” Its research focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms control, proliferation, regional studies, Air Force policy, information warfare, environmental security, and space policy.

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects researchers from within the military academic community, and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and workshops and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of private and government organizations. INSS is in its seventh year of providing valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research products.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James M. Smith". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "James" written in a larger, more prominent script than the last name "Smith".

JAMES M. SMITH
Director

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Peace operations continue to evolve. With each successive operation, doctrine and organizational arrangements are updated to reflect past experiences. The traditional peacekeeping conducted during the Cold War is largely a thing of the past; new forms of conflict and new participants have changed the nature of peacekeeping dramatically. In few cases can blue-helmeted observers from non-US countries expect to merely stand between two warring states and observe a cease-fire. Modern peacekeeping frequently involves non-state actors, often within a single country, and may include missions such as humanitarian assistance, refugee resettlement, demining, and nation-building. American involvement has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War, and the participation of civilian and private relief agencies adds new stresses to operational principles such as “objective” and “unity of command.” The United States military will have to be flexible enough to support peace operations with varying operational objectives and constraints.

This study examines the role of the Air Force in future peace operations. For simplicity’s sake, it uses the term “peacekeeping” to encompass both impartial *peacekeeping* and more coercive *peace enforcement*. The authors draw upon the experience of the US and other nations to improve understanding of how peacekeeping forces operate and shed light on how best to employ American forces. This paper reviews existing US military doctrine and examines the impact, both positive and negative, that peacekeeping has on combat readiness. The authors then suggest areas for consideration regarding the preparation for and conduct of peace operations.

An extensive literature review provided the foundation for this study. It was supplemented by an understanding of current missions, policies, and doctrine gained through interviews with military members and civilian policymakers at the United Nations and the Departments of Defense and State, and with scholars in this field. The validity of the initial research was tested in field visits to the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy, which oversees NATO air operations in the Balkan region, and to Task Force Eagle and the 401st Expeditionary Air Base Group (401st EABG), the US Army and Air Force operations headquartered near Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, that are part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR). These visits allowed the authors to meet with commanders and their forces and observe operations firsthand.

Below is a brief list summarizing the authors' main conclusions and recommendations for US Air Force participation in peace operations.

- Air Force doctrine designed specifically for peace operations is not required so long as appropriate doctrine for various functional areas is incorporated into strategies and operation plans.
- Coercive airpower can play a role in peace operations, but the most powerful contribution of airpower is likely to come through air mobility.
- The ability to rapidly redeploy personnel and equipment from a peace operation to a major theater war is critical, and should be considered when designing operation plans.
- There is no need for Air Force units to be specifically designated for peace support operations.
- Commanders must carefully analyze mission objectives and the threat environment to determine the best mix of forces, rather than simply using all available assets.
- Current rotation policies are effective, especially for support personnel in all but the highest-demand career fields, and allow

more Air Force members to gain operational experience without placing an impossible strain upon them.

- The use of reserve component forces in peace operations, especially among support forces, could be substantially increased.
- Far from reducing combat effectiveness, training for and participating in peace operations can be performed with little adverse impact on readiness, and in many cases may improve Air Force members' readiness for combat.

Dag Hammarskjöld, former Secretary-General of the UN, once said "peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it." As long as the American government and public feel that peace operations will help promote national security interests, the US military will be called upon to participate in those missions alongside many other agencies. This paper neither advocates the use of US military forces for peace operations nor recommends they not be employed. Rather, it addresses the current reality, and it should help military members understand the very unusual tasks they will no doubt be called upon to perform in the next peace operation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper is based on a year-long study sponsored by the Institute for National Security Studies. It would not have been possible without the support of many people who agreed to meet and be interviewed by us, whether in an office in New York or on a deployment in Europe. Others assisted us greatly by offering their insight and perspectives on this study, and by providing logistics support that enabled our meetings and travel.

First, the men and women of the 401st Expeditionary Air Base Group and Task Force Eagle have our sincerest appreciation. In the middle of a contingency in a hazardous area, they spent many hours with us, suggesting new areas of study and validating or disproving concepts we had examined. They were a highly motivated team who allowed us to see all facets of the operation in Bosnia. We would especially like to thank the 401st EABG Commander, Colonel Mark Busch, and the Vice Commander, Major John Plaza, for allowing an Academy cadet and a Doctrine Analyst to come into the middle of their operation for few days. Over in Operation DELIBERATE GUARD, Commander John Patten, USN, and Major Josh Douglas, USAF, welcomed us into the Combined Air Operations Center in Vicenza, Italy, allowing us a firsthand look at air operations over Bosnia.

A number of people in the United States offered us their insight on the role of the Air Force and the military in general. Colonel Richard Roan, USMC, the Military Advisor to the US Ambassador to the United Nations, offered to meet and discuss the functioning of the UN. Many of our interviews at the UN were made possible by Captain Greg Gilletti, USAF, who is assigned to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and who opened a number of doors for us that might otherwise have remained closed. Professor Dave Davis and the faculty at George Mason

University's Program on Peacekeeping Policy reviewed our findings from Bosnia, as did Bert Braun and Andy Bair of the State Department. Their assistance helped us interpret the new, and sometimes contradictory, data we had collected

General James McCarthy, USAF (ret), Olin Professor of Political Science at the Air Force Academy, provided a great deal of guidance on this paper. As the professor conducting an independent study program for then-Cadet Cukierman, he was instrumental in getting this project started.

We would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Pete Hays, USAF, former Director of INSS, who invited us to work together on this project and who, incidentally, provided the funding to do so. We also appreciate the assistance of Diana Heerdt of INSS, who handled travel orders and money matters and who assisted with many of the arrangements for our overseas travel.

Finally, a big "thank you" to our bosses, Colonel Roger Philipsek at the Air Force Doctrine Center, and Major Martha Meeker at the Air Force Academy, who allowed us to take the time to do this in the first place.

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THE NEXT PEACE OPERATION

U.S. AIR FORCE ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES

TRENDS IN PEACEKEEPING

Peace operations have increased dramatically in both number and complexity in recent years. One oft-cited statistic is that there have been more UN peace operations since the end of the Cold War than there were during it.¹ This is not surprising; the changes in the world have allowed old conflicts to flare up as control over nations shifted away from the Soviet Union and the United States toward local actors. The United States has found itself more involved not only because it is the sole remaining superpower, and thus, in a world leadership position, but also because the superpowers were often excluded from UN operations during the Cold War because of their inability to remain impartial in a conflict. As the nature of peace operations continues to evolve, military leaders and planners must understand the context in which they will be conducted. This section explains the range of missions actually encompassed in peace operations and discusses trends in international relations that will likely set the stage for the next peace operation.

INTERSTATE VS INTRASTATE CONFLICTS

Early peacekeeping missions tended to put impartial UN forces between states, to provide the breathing room necessary to reach a political resolution. Recent UN missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Georgia, however, demonstrate that many new conflicts will take place between parties within one state. Finding oneself placed between various non-state actors is quite different from being placed between the military forces of two or more countries. Threats are not as easily identifiable, negotiations and communication with the entities can be more difficult, and there is less control over the actions of non-state actors.

Commanders involved in intrastate conflicts should be aware of the unique challenges they will face and plan to meet them.

COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

The British doctrine for peace operations is titled *Wider Peacekeeping*, a reflection of the new demands being placed upon peacekeepers.² No longer do they expect to merely stand between two opposing forces.

Instead, they are concerned with other issues reaching into the humanitarian, economic, and political realms. Recent experience has demonstrated that the trend in peace operations is that they are but one part of a complex emergency, encompassing humanitarian assistance in addition to conflict stabilization and support to political resolution. The *JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* outlines some of the characteristics of a complex emergency:³

- Increased use of asymmetrical means by belligerents
- Dominance of political objectives
- Presence and involvement of nongovernmental, private voluntary, and international organizations; media; and other civilians in the joint operations area--these groups will have an impact on operations
- Usually takes place in a failed state
- Numerous parties to the conflict
- Undisciplined factions (fail to respond to their own leaders)
- Ineffective or short-lived cease fires
- Absence of law and order
- Gross violations of human rights
- Risk of local armed opposition to peace operations forces
- Collapse of civil infrastructure
- Presence of many refugees and internally displaced persons
- Poorly defined operations area

THE UNITED NATIONS AS A VEHICLE FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

The United Nations will be the most likely authorizing vehicle for future peace operations. Some argue that in the emerging multipolar world, nations cannot act unilaterally without upsetting certain international relations. Others argue that in order to preserve the unipolar moment, the US must engage in multilateral decision processes to establish strong relations with other nations and preserve the status quo. Still others see that the UN as the only legitimate institution that can intervene where national sovereignty is concerned and impartially conduct a peace operation.

Forming an ad hoc coalition in response to an emerging crisis is infeasible. Stephen Walt and Randall Schweller argue over whether nations form coalitions to balance a threat or bandwagon for opportunity.⁴ But both will agree the degree of interest involved in a peace operation, particularly a humanitarian one, is not sufficient for nations to form a coalition. Nations tend to form coalitions only in response to an immediate threat or vital national interest. In the Gulf War, Iraqi aggression and the supply of oil were incentive enough to form a coalition despite many nations' differing agendas and differing views. The degree of threat or interest associated with peace operations is unlikely to be sufficient for multiple nations to come together and form a coalition. In the case of Bosnia, preservation of NATO and maintaining regional stability were the driving interests behind the intervention, not humanitarian reasons.

Coalition formation usually takes too long for an effective response to an emerging crisis. To respond after a conflict erupts, the costs of restoring peace may make the operation itself infeasible. In the Gulf, it took six months from the time Iraq invaded Kuwait to the time the coalition retaliated.

There are several reasons for the US not to intervene unilaterally. The nation loses the benefit of distributing the burden among several nations. J. Martin Rochester suggests this is one of the purposes of an international organization, to offer “a formal arrangement transcending national boundaries that provides for the establishment of institutional machinery to facilitate cooperation among members in the security, economic, social, or related fields.”⁵ In Bosnia, the US contributes only about one-third of the forces, and the costs are dispersed over the members participating in the coalition.

A unilateral intervention might also be perceived differently by other nations. It may be viewed as an attempt to expand a nation’s influence, possibly threatening another country’s interests. Acting unilaterally risks increasing international tensions and potentially creating new conflicts. An international organization like the UN has added legitimacy, representing as it does world interests rather than a single nation’s interests. Both US and UN peacekeeping doctrine consider legitimacy one of the fundamental principles of peace operations.⁶ Legitimacy is crucial to obtain the willing acceptance of the people and to sustain a peace in the long run.

PEACEKEEPING BY PROXY

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a tendency toward more involvement by regional organizations in peace operations. This is not entirely new; the Multinational Force Observers (MFO) in the Sinai and the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s demonstrated that nations can work together outside the normal UN structure to achieve UN objectives. But in recent years, the use of existing alliances has tended to replace informal coalitions. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s 1997 intervention in Albania, NATO’s Implementation (and later, Stabilization) Force in the former Yugoslavia, and the Economic Community of West African

States' (ECOWAS) involvement in Liberia, all point to the increased use of regional organizations to carry out UN resolutions.

Given the UN's failure and NATO's relative success in Bosnia, the UN will likely find itself "sub-contracting" out to NATO or other regional security arrangement when an operation arises that requires a military element. NATO has demonstrated its effectiveness in operations such as DENY FLIGHT and JOINT ENDEAVOR. NATO airpower was decisive in bringing the entities to the peace table and stopping the fighting. The Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) have kept the fighting from re-emerging and have truly been a stabilizing presence. NATO's success with IFOR and SFOR, especially in contrast with the UN's failure with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) will put pressure on the UN to give up military missions to NATO or other regional security arrangement.

However, policy makers will most likely use the UN as the authorizing vehicle for conducting future peace operations. The United Nations provides an avenue through which all potentially interested parties might participate in the control and planning of a peacekeeping operation. This is vital to the acceptance, support, and legitimacy of operations that may violate national sovereignty or impinge on other treaties or alliances. Furthermore, the United Nations provides an existing infrastructure for combined multinational operations. That means consolidating resources into a unity of effort and also spreading cost through burden sharing. It provides a medium for connecting civilian humanitarian non-governmental and transnational organizations with other governmental and inter-governmental organizations.

DOCTRINE FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace operations use minimal force to accomplish their objectives, which tend to be more limited than those in higher-intensity conflicts. The role of military forces in peace operations has expanded in recent years, from

merely providing a presence to offering other supporting functions such as the distribution of relief supplies, the apprehension of persons indicted for war crimes, economic sanction enforcement, and demining. It is important to understand what is required for these operations to be successful and evaluate whether or not current doctrine is sufficient to enable accomplishment of the mission.

PRINCIPLES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Military leaders have realized throughout history that certain principles are essential to victory in a conflict. The US military recognizes nine Principles of War that guide the planning and conduct of warfare. While following them does not guarantee success, ignoring them will almost certainly lead to failure. The more limited objectives of military operations other than war (MOOTW) and the smaller supporting role played by the military led to the development of principles specifically designed to meet the goals of such operations. The Principles of MOOTW include:

- Legitimacy
- Security
- Restraint
- Unity of Effort
- Perseverance
- Objective⁷

These principles are essential to success in a peace operation, though their applicability differs between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Some variation of these principles would also be appropriate for all peace operations. The experiences of the United Nations and the United States, as well as those of other countries, demonstrate that the following concepts are critical to success in peace operations.

Impartiality. Though difficult to maintain at times, impartiality may be the key factor in the success of a peace operation and in the safety and

security of military forces. The parties to the conflict must each feel that the peace force is there as an impartial buffer rather than as another threat. If they perceive that the peacekeepers are siding with one entity over another, the force may then be viewed as an enemy, which can lead to violence, cause the political process to break down, disrupt peacebuilding efforts, and ultimately cause the failure of the mission. Impartiality is more likely to be found in traditional peacekeeping than in coercive peace enforcement, but even in the latter case, impartiality should be a goal that military forces strive for.

Having the United Nations sanction or conduct an operation lends an air of impartiality to the peace support force. As a world body, the UN advocates global interests rather than the interests of a single nation or regional group. One of the reasons UN peacekeepers wear common, distinctive insignia is to demonstrate that they are acting not on behalf of their own country but on behalf of the world's interest in peace and stability. All military forces should take steps to demonstrate impartiality. They must treat members of all parties in the same fashion, being careful not to show favoritism or take harsh measures against one group while letting another get by with lighter treatment. Impartiality is not the same as neutrality; peacekeepers must respond to incidents with the actions appropriate to their mandate rather than simply ignoring them, but they must ensure they do so in a fair and equitable manner.

Consent. Consent is a key factor that must be achieved to the maximum extent possible before initiating a peace operation. When the parties in a conflict can agree that they want to resolve it, and concur with the introduction of a peace force to provide a buffer zone while the solution is worked out, there is a much higher likelihood of success. With consent also comes acceptance of the peace force and subsequently a lower threat to its members. A true peacekeeping mission is one in which consent is achieved among all the parties. Peace enforcement missions often have the consent of one or more entities in a conflict, but

probably not all of them. Commanders must understand the degree of consent to have a clear understanding of the mission and the threat.

Achieving consent is a political issue; maintaining it is a military one. The force must be operating under a legitimate mandate and its members must conduct themselves in a professional manner toward the local inhabitants. It must demonstrate that it is capable of maintaining the peace and carrying out its mission if it is to be viewed as effective and accepted by all the parties. Impartiality is a key factor in the maintenance of consent. A loss of consent leads to a significant change in the mission, and commanders must recognize that loss and take steps to both protect their forces and continue to work toward mission accomplishment.

Restraint. One of the primary purposes of a peace operation is to reduce the chance of a conflict and limit the escalation of violence. That being the case, a peace mission will not be well served by knee-jerk responses to incidents or by bringing disproportionate force to bear in retaliation. As violence begets violence, an escalation by the peace force may well lead to further escalation by the parties to the conflict. A prime example of this is the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. President Reagan's use of naval strikes in retaliation against limited Druse Muslim attacks and in support of the Lebanese government's Christian army provoked a further response in the form of a truck bomb attack that killed over 240 US Marines.⁸

Restraint can be difficult for a military once prepared only for high-intensity conflict. There is an understandably strong urge to bring in overwhelming firepower when bullets or mortars start flying. A force should be structured so that it has available only the maximum power that a commander would be willing to use; once that point is reached, it is better to simply withdraw than to continue the escalation. Rules of engagement (ROEs) should be designed to encourage restraint and minimize the possibility of accidents and misunderstandings that might

lead to an increase in violence. Despite the restrictions imposed by ROEs, they should not take away from the individual soldier's right to defend himself or those around him from lethal or injurious force. While ROEs must be clear, the requirement for restraint demands judgement on the part of the individual that may go beyond that required in a more conventional battle. Forces must be well trained not only in combat skills but in effective decisionmaking if they are to protect themselves while also accomplishing the mission.

Unity of Effort. In operations involving military forces from different services and nations, unity of effort allows these forces to focus on the same objective despite the fact that they might not all fall under a single commander. In a peace operation, and especially in modern complex emergencies, military forces will be working alongside humanitarian organizations, government relief agencies, and intergovernmental organizations such as the UN or ECOWAS. In addition to the language and cultural barriers that exist among members of different militaries, there is the added pressure that comes from the natural conflict between military and civilian mindsets. Unity of effort is critical if these distinct organizations are to remain focused on the same goal.

Military forces that are likely to work with civilian organizations should learn about the goals of those groups and how they function. Quite often the representatives of civilian relief agencies have lived in the region for some time and are very familiar with the current situation, the culture, and the language. The military can learn a lot from these individuals, and commanders should take full advantage of their experience. While military leaders do not command these other organizations, they should attempt to coordinate with them so that their activities complement each other. A civil-military operations center (CMOC) provides a central place where civilian and military

representatives can come together and align their actions to work toward a common end-state.⁹

Perseverance. Conflicts that have been a long time in the making will not be resolved overnight. The introduction of a peacekeeping force may lead to short-term stability, but the political peacemaking and economic and social peacebuilding efforts will take time to be effective. The amount of time required depends upon the complexity of the situation and the willingness of the parties to work toward a solution. The military peacekeeping operation may be the first part to be initiated and the last to depart. For political reasons, it may not be feasible to admit up front that an operation may take years to complete, but military planners should realize that a long-term operation is a strong possibility and should prepare accordingly.

Forces that deploy for peace operations should do so with the understanding that this will not be a contingency lasting merely a few days. A logistics system must be established that can keep the force supplied and operable over the long term. Rotation policies must be designed to ensure that personnel can rotate in and out of the operation at reasonable times while still maintaining a high-quality force. Plans should be made for reasonable facilities that can accommodate a military force over a long period of time. Steps should be taken to offer recurring training for military members so that skills not being used during a particular mission do not deteriorate. One of the most important issues is to prepare the American public for the reality that military members will be deployed to a region for a significant period of time, but that is more a responsibility of civilian policy makers than of military leaders.

Objective. Any operation that is going to be successful must have a clearly defined objective. An attainable end-state must be defined, and planners should determine intermediate objectives that lead to attainment of an ultimate goal. Since military objectives are designed to achieve political objectives, the peace support force must focus its efforts on the

political goals described in a mandate from the United Nations or a comparable statement.

For political reasons, the mandate found in a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) may be somewhat vague. Military leaders must be able to analyze that mandate and develop military objectives that will help lead to the desired end-state. Forces throughout the chain of command should understand the objectives of the operation so that they can make decisions and take actions that contribute to overall mission success. Such an understanding leads to better judgement and a more effective force. Commanders also need to realize when the focus of the mission changes, as happened in Somalia when the emphasis shifted from supporting humanitarian relief operations to imposing stability between clans, and take action to adapt their military objectives as well as their force structure and their daily operations. It may be hard to measure progress toward a military goal, as mission objectives may require the peacekeepers to attain a certain degree of stability and then maintain the status quo, since the ultimate conflict resolution will come through political and economic means rather than through force. It can be very difficult to measure "success" until the operation is actually completed.

These concepts are critical to the success of peace operations. Military members should understand these issues and the impact they have. Planners and commanders must develop and lead forces that can provide stability in the short run to allow long-term solutions to be enacted. The best means of conducting and preparing for military operations is reflected in strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine.

JOINT AND AIR FORCE PERSPECTIVES

Military doctrine is a compilation of history, experience, and military thought regarding the best methods of employing forces. Doctrine published by the military services provides the officially sanctioned beliefs about how operations should be conducted. While it is not

directive in nature (meaning commanders can apply it or deviate from it as required by their specific situation) it is the basis for training and educating military members, and for planning and conducting operations.

There is a sense that perhaps US doctrine for peace operations is not appropriate for the objectives of those missions. Barry Blechman and J. Matthew Vaccaro of the Henry L. Stimson Center suggest that US doctrine may be too aggressive, and that it is in fact perceived this way by other countries. They contend that US doctrine is based on the premise that forces will be used predominately in a semi-permissive environment, and as a result, doctrine focuses on more aggressive aspects. Some belief exists among the traditional troop-contributing countries that US efforts are misdirected, and that significant US involvement may lead to training or an operational environment that does not meet the needs of a peace operation.¹⁰

There are two kinds of doctrine within the US military: Joint doctrine, which addresses the use of all military capabilities, and Service doctrine, which considers the capabilities of an individual Service. Joint doctrine tends to be very “land-centric,” perhaps because the Army and Marine Corps have a long history of developing and publishing doctrine while the Air Force and Navy have only recently taken significant interest in it. Both Joint and Service doctrine offer some insight into how the US military views its role in peace operations, and what it considers important for success.

Joint Doctrine. Joint doctrine for US military forces in peace operations is articulated in two documents: Joint Pub 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, and the *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*. While the *Handbook* is not doctrine per se, it translates doctrinal issues into more specific guidance for Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders and their staffs based on experience gained in past operations. Published in 1994 and 1997 respectively (Joint Pub 3-07.3 is currently being revised),

they provide the basis for our understanding of how to conduct peace operations.

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations. This joint publication is an important document for Air Force members participating in peace operations. While focusing on the interaction between forces and the local population, which is primarily the function of the land force, it establishes the context in which the Air Force will function.

The chapter on peacekeeping discusses the capabilities that air and space forces provide.¹¹ Some of the capabilities offered by air assets include:

- Airlift
- Surveillance and Reconnaissance
- Command, Control, Communications & Information Gathering
- Aerial Refueling
- Search and Rescue
- Air Traffic Control Support
- Medical Evacuation

Space assets, meanwhile, offer:

- Space-based Communications
- Navigation
- Weather
- Mapping
- Charting and Geodesy Support
- Surveillance
- Theater Ballistic Missile Attack Warning
- Monitoring of Environmental Conditions

The first capability listed for air assets, Airlift, is the most common contribution made by the US Air Force. This includes not only the mobility aircraft but the air mobility support offered at an aerial port of

debarkation (APOD) established to support an operation (such as Tuzla AB) and the increased support to enhance the permanent enroute structure (such as the addition of extra personnel at Ramstein AB, Germany, to support SFOR operations). The relevance of other capabilities will depend on the particular mission and the threat to forces. One deficiency of this publication is that, while it discusses the capabilities important for peacekeeping, it does not expand on this when the discussion turns to peace enforcement. Lethal force takes on greater importance when enforcing sanctions, defending protected zones, and forcing compliance with a cease-fire. This force must be both precise and restrained, in order to avoid causing collateral damage and encouraging escalation. The combat capability offered by air assets is not discussed, and a joint force planner may ignore an important capability that offers high payback with relatively low risk.

Joint Pub 3-07.3 lends credence to the belief of some that the United States is too aggressive in peace operations. The chapter on peacekeeping assumes a fairly high risk to forces, more so than is found in documents published by the United Nations or other countries. The threat level that is assumed is more likely to be found in a peace enforcement, rather than a peacekeeping, environment. While it may be a good idea to prepare for the worst-case scenario, it is possible that such preparations may help bring about such a scenario. The combative paradigm established for peacekeeping may indicate that foreign concerns about the United States are well placed.

Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations.

The *Handbook* includes an extensive discussion of the requirements for a successful operation, with emphasis on complex emergencies (e.g., negotiation and mediation and the operation of displaced person camps are covered). Staff organization, command and control within the UN, and relations with civil organizations are explored in detail. Essential functions such as logistics, intelligence, public affairs, legal support, and

force protection have different capabilities and needs in peace operations, and are placed in the proper context.

The *Handbook* outlines suggested JTF organization and discusses the responsibilities of different staff elements. It relies on lessons learned in past operations, and applies those lessons to situations that are likely in the future, rather than just focusing on “traditional” peacekeeping. It goes into extensive detail on the application of different forces and capabilities, essentially providing a checklist, not necessarily of actions to take, but of factors to consider. It takes the functions mentioned in JP 3-07.3 and examines the best means to accomplish them. This will help a commander and staff in the planning process as well as when responding to changes in the mission environment or the objectives. Such a book is very useful for commanders who are chosen on an ad-hoc basis for a mission they may not have trained for.

Air Force Doctrine. Air missions in the former Yugoslavia have run the gamut over the years from supporting the arms embargo and economic sanctions (Operation SHARP GUARD); monitoring a no-fly zone (Operation SKY WATCH); enforcing a no-fly zone while providing close air support (CAS), offensive air support (OAS), and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) (Operation DENY FLIGHT) to United Nations peacekeepers; delivering relief supplies (Operation PROVIDE PROMISE); and providing coercive air power in NATO’s IFOR and SFOR (Operations DELIBERATE ENDEAVOR and DELIBERATE GUARD).¹² The Air Force’s ongoing presence in the region shows the versatility of airpower and demonstrates that this capability may be employed across a wide range of terrain, threats, and mission areas.

The Air Force does not have doctrine specifically for peace operations. In fact, current operational-level doctrine is fairly limited in the Air Force, though it is presently being developed for a broad range of mission areas. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, *Military Operations Other Than War*, provides a discussion of the principles of

MOOTW and different mission areas, including slightly more than a page on peace operations. It also touches on training requirements and command and control relationships, but because this document addresses MOOTW as a whole, it does not examine in-depth the specific needs of any one mission area such as peace operations. As a result, Air Force training, planning, and conduct of such operations, whether in a combat or support role, is performed ad hoc. Planners for DENY FLIGHT had no guidance from the Air Force on how to prepare for such an operation.¹³ Air crews could not understand why particular target assignments, weapon selection, and rules of engagement were appropriate because they had little or no understanding of the requirements and critical factors in peace operations.¹⁴ While Joint doctrine will provide commanders, planners, and operators with some understanding of the requirements of peace operations, airmen need to be able to articulate the capabilities of aerospace power to a joint force commander. Lieutenant Colonel David Dean of the Airpower Research Institute wrote that “the Air Force must develop, from a philosophic base that postulates the limited goals and specialized means applicable to low-intensity conflict, the doctrine and organization to support an assisting, integrating, and intervening capability.”¹⁵ AFDD 2-3 is a step in the right direction, but airmen must ensure they know how best to apply appropriate Air Force doctrine for different capabilities in a low-intensity environment such as peace operations.

Though it can be a decisive tool for commanders in peace operations, air power will likely play a limited, and fairly specific, role. As Colonel Robert Owen wrote in his summary of the Balkan Air Campaign Study, “a political breakup, in and of itself, provides few targets against which air strategists may ply their trade.”¹⁶ Aircraft are often used primarily for airlift and information gathering; the application of force is not a common mission in peacekeeping. Even in a peace enforcement role, such as in Bosnia in 1995, airpower requires precision

and restraint to such a degree that it may be more difficult to use it effectively than it would be to use some other asset to accomplish the same goal.

Peace operations tend to involve the occupation of territory by military forces. This occupation provides a stabilizing presence. Combat airpower may be able to provide that presence while reserving the possibility of applying force against land and air targets. Major Marc Dippold examines the concept of *air occupation* and suggests that airpower is appropriate for less-intrusive scenarios such as coercion, sanctions enforcement, or creating a buffer zone.¹⁷ The ability to do so in Bosnia was somewhat limited, though, by the restriction requiring aircraft to remain above 10,000 feet.¹⁸ Though it decreased the risk to the pilots, it also reduced the effectiveness of the "presence" mission.

The Russian experience in Chechnya demonstrated that appropriate fixed-wing assets will often be more useful than rotary-wing aircraft in low-intensity operations. Ground attack aircraft offer more protection and versatility than do helicopters. Army aviation forces found it difficult to conduct reconnaissance, much less combat operations, due to the threat of ground fire that could come from well-concealed enemy forces surrounded by a noncombatant population. Given the limitations on firepower required in these operations, the best defense, in this case, is probably a good *defense*; that is, an aircraft that moves fast and high enough to afford protection to the aircraft with a cockpit designed to protect the pilot.¹⁹

General Charles L. Boyd (USAF, Ret.) rightly points out that airpower alone does not promise conflict resolution.²⁰ But the same can be said for any aspect of military power. The military can stop the fighting and enforce or enable a cease fire, but it cannot resolve underlying problems. The Air Force will support the peacemaking process, providing an environment for short-term negotiations, while peacebuilding provides an environment for lasting peace. There are a

number of issues that will have a significant effect on the peacekeeping effort, and military forces should understand the impact they will have.

CRITICAL ISSUES

Rules Of Engagement. Rules of Engagement (ROEs) serve as guidelines for the use of force by military members in a particular operation. ROEs reflect the Laws of Armed Conflict, the threat to friendly forces and to peace, and the objectives of an operation. Each operation will have its own set of ROEs that may change as the conditions driving them change. Effective ROEs should include a description of the mission, a discussion of the primacy of self defense, and general rules for the use of force. ROEs must be distributed to the force and need to be understood by all personnel.

Rules of engagement in a peace operation will limit the use of force more so than the ROEs in a mid- to high-intensity conflict. The threat to peacekeepers should be less than that for forces who expect to be in combat. The objectives in a peace operation are to contain conflict and reduce violence, so there will be greater restriction on the use of force that could lead to further escalation. To accomplish their mission, peacekeepers must maintain a sense of legitimacy, something that can be easily destroyed by a perceived overuse of force against one entity or another.

The ROEs for Operation JOINT GUARD provide a good example of commander's guidance for the use of force. While prescribing a minimal use of force, they nonetheless authorize military members to fire first if they feel there is an immediate danger to life or to certain equipment. The rules in a peace enforcement operation will tend to be more liberal than in peacekeeping due to the implied lack of consent by one or more parties to the conflict, and the subsequent increased threat to the force and to non-combatants. ROEs will also tend to be stricter in an urban environment rather than in open terrain because of the increased presence of non-combatants, the risk that munitions will strike other than their

intended targets, and the possibility for serious damage to essential facilities and infrastructure. Because ROEs will be more stringent in these missions than in a full combat operation, forces from the commander down to the lowest ranking individual will have to exercise great judgement in the use of force. This requires a higher degree of situational awareness and faster decisionmaking skills than might otherwise be the norm.

Displaced Persons and Refugees. The increase in the use of peacekeeping as one component of a complex emergency has increased the impact of refugees and other displaced persons on an operation. The presence of these persons will affect a combat environment and can put a serious strain on logistics systems if part of the mission involves caring for them. It will also lead to the introduction of humanitarian relief agencies, both government and non-governmental, which leads to command and control issues and requirements to provide transportation and security for agency representatives. Aerial ports that support military operations may also be used to support relief efforts. Security concerns may increase as refugees seek shelter in the protected area of a military facility. Intratheater airlift may be used to transport refugees or carry relief supplies in addition to supporting military forces.

Demining. The prevalence of mines throughout the world makes them a threat to peacekeepers everywhere. Not only must they be trained to avoid the hazards of mines, they may be called upon to oversee or conduct demining operations. Other UN or private agencies may be brought in to clear mined areas. Military forces should be trained on how to operate in mined areas and need to know how to safely evacuate injured personnel after a mine incident. Medical staffs should be prepared to treat casualties from mines, both among the peacekeepers and the general population. UN observation posts on the Kuwait-Iraq border, for instance, often have civilians come to them seeking assistance after a mine incident.²¹

Because of their military applicability, both military and civilian airfields may have previously been mined during a conflict. Aerial ports and combat airfields must be cleared of unexploded ordnance, or at least have dangerous areas clearly marked, before they can be safely used. Safe routes should be marked as well. All personnel are responsible for maintaining mine awareness and monitoring the emergence of new threats.

Force Protection. In the wake of the bombing of Khobar Towers in 1996, *force protection* has emerged as a catch-all term encompassing all methods for maintaining the security of military forces. By ensuring proper security, not only can risk to individuals be minimized, but the threat of escalation and continuing violence is also lessened. An attack against peacekeepers may result in a lethal response, which can lead to a resumption or continuation of the conflict.

Care must be taken not to appear so strong as to be perceived as a threat. A force that takes protective measures out of proportion to the risk it faces may appear offensive rather than defensive in nature, diminishing its perceived impartiality and reducing its legitimacy. Because of this requirement, commanders must have an effective intelligence-gathering system that can measure not only capabilities but also the attitudes of the local population. Contingency plans must be available and a response force must be identified in advance to provide a force protection capability that can react quickly but that can maintain a low profile when not needed. Peacekeeping forces should endeavor to use the smallest number of personnel required to perform a mission in order to minimize the force's footprint and limit the number of potential targets.

Other countries are sometimes puzzled by what they perceive to be an American obsession with force protection. They question the emphasis that US forces place on security. In Tuzla, American members of SFOR could go off base only on official business, and had to do so

wearing protective vests and helmets and carrying weapons. This led to morale problems as they saw military members from other countries going into town off-duty and doing so without the heavy protective equipment.²² In addition, contact with the local populace is one of the critical components of a peace operation, and American forces may need to consider changing their policies in light of the diminished threat and the overall needs of the mission.²³ On the other hand, American forces often present a more inviting target due to their high visibility. One Air Force NCO at Tuzla AB referred to a national flag displayed from a Nordic-Polish Brigade vehicle as the "don't bother shooting me, I'm not an American" flag.

Normalization. Military forces have the opportunity to contribute significantly to the normalization process that is so critical to peacebuilding. The restoration of a normal living environment can go a long way toward facilitating the resolution of a conflict. Rebuilding basic functions such as water, electricity, railroads, postal service, and civil aviation, can enable the population to raise their standard of living and see that there are attractive alternatives to conflict.

In Bosnia, SFOR developed the rail system to ease the movement of forces from Germany into the theater. This makes the rail lines available for civilian freight and passenger use as well, for the first time in years. Commercial aviation is also returning; the Bosnian government is building a terminal at the American-operated Tuzla Air Base to provide passenger service, and as of April 1998 there were already 25 flights a day into the Sarajevo airport, which is operated by the French military.²⁴ While normalization should not be the focus of military operations, planners should consider the peacebuilding benefits of their activities and try to take advantage of them.

COMBAT READINESS

IMPACT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The military supports the national security interests of the United States in whatever manner directed by the political leadership. Since the end of the Cold War, this has meant a surge in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, but there is no denying that the military considers the fighting and winning of America's wars as its primary purpose. While it exercises this ability only rarely, the cost of failure demands a force prepared for combat.

The effects of peacekeeping on combat readiness are difficult to quantify. The capabilities of forces after conducting such missions vary so much that it is impossible to say that peace operations are "good" or "bad." There are many factors involved, such as a unit's mission and the situation in which it was involved. It is important to consider all the effects that peacekeeping can create. This allows commanders to minimize negative effects while taking advantage of the benefits of participation.

Negative Impact On Forces. Of greatest concern is that combat skills may erode after participation in peacekeeping. The demand for restraint and minimal force is contrary to the manner in which combat is typically conducted. For example:

- Combat aircrews flying "presence" missions in a low-threat environment may become complacent about surface-to-air missile threats and enemy aircraft. Skills required to ensure precision strike capability may erode over time when the lethal force of airpower is kept on call but held in check.
- Planning skills and the ability to recognize and seize opportunities may deteriorate when the mission objective is to maintain the status quo rather than to maneuver an enemy into defeat.²⁵

The low intensity of peacekeeping can dull the combat "edge" attained by forces that have prepared to fight in mid- to high-intensity conflicts.

The National Military Strategy demands the ability to redeploy forces from low-intensity operations to major theater wars.²⁶ If forces have lost their skills, requiring time and resources to sharpen them, their ability to redeploy quickly to a combat environment is affected.²⁷

Deployed units also may miss valuable training. The pace of the operation may not allow for training, or the situation might be exacerbated by training exercises that could appear hostile.²⁸ The lack of combat training can lead to a long-term degradation of readiness.

Aircrews that remain technically qualified to fly combat may not have the same degree of skill they would have otherwise had.

Another problem involving redeployment is that many of the forces required to initiate a new operation are also required to terminate smaller contingencies.²⁹ Air mobility support personnel operate both the aerial ports of debarkation for the new crisis and the aerial ports of embarkation for forces leaving other operations. Civil engineers are required to build new forward bases while tearing down and moving equipment from the old. So long as there are military personnel at a base, whether departing or arriving, there will be a need for Security Forces, personnel specialists, medical staff, and many other functional areas. These forces will be spread very thin during the early days of a newly emerging crisis, and this will continue until the smaller contingency has been terminated.

401st EABG members suggested they could close down Tuzla AB quickly, leaving facilities behind rather than tearing them down, but the Air Force personnel could not depart until thousands of Army personnel had been processed out of the country.

The current operations tempo has an effect on military readiness that receives a great deal of press. Support forces are in high demand, and combat aircrews find themselves deployed more often than before, often to "sit and wait" rather than for missions that immediately demand their

skills. The strain on personnel and their equipment means not only a challenge for retention of qualified personnel but also an increase in the amount of time necessary to prepare for a combat role once again. The Air Force's plan to use a system of rotating Air Expeditionary Forces to support contingencies is expected to reduce the strain on personnel, but it is as yet untested and still has many hurdles to overcome before it can be effectively implemented.

Positive Impact On Forces. While there may be a negative impact on combat capability, there is also a perception that training for and participating in peacekeeping may improve combat readiness. It is difficult to make the blanket statement that "peacekeeping is good for readiness" because the effects on different forces will not be the same. In many cases, though, the skills needed for combat may be practiced or improved upon by training for or being a part of a peace operation.

One of the biggest potential advantages is that conferred by operational rather than training or in-garrison experience. Participation in a real-world event is different from a training environment because there are no controls, no script, and no observer/controllers in an operation. There is also the opportunity to develop combat skills that may not be routinely used in a day-to-day job at home. Medical personnel will face real casualties rather than the simulated injuries found in exercises. Human intelligence specialists will be able to use their skills in an uncertain environment rather than with actors in a training scenario.

The positive effects of operational experience are not reserved for operational support personnel. Combat aircrews find themselves working from forward-deployed bases, reacting to changing threats, and mission requirements and adapting to the realities of a strained logistics system. Targeteers may find peacekeeping more challenging because of the limits on targets and munitions. Thus, both combat forces and support personnel can benefit from exposure to operational conditions.

These operations also afford the opportunity to broaden individual skills. Given the need for a limited military presence in a peace operation, manning for these missions is minimal. As a result, deployed personnel often assume new tasks that require immediate on-the-job training. At Tuzla AB, for example, a Civil Engineering heavy equipment operator left with the skills of a master carpenter, a command post controller spent her spare time working with the airfield manager, and a senior NCO running the Transportation branch also found himself overseeing Supply.³⁰ The introduction of personnel to new duties enhances their versatility, one of the tenets of aerospace power.

US Air Force members also find themselves working closely with representatives of other Services and other countries. This experience further improves the ability to integrate with such forces when the need arises in a combat environment. The joint and multinational environment at the CAOC in Vicenza allows Air Force planners to learn about the culture and perspectives of other forces. Potential problems that could seriously impede a relationship might be identified in a peace operation and addressed before the parties work together in combat.³¹ The exposure to different perspectives may also allow airmen to learn new ways to accomplish their mission more effectively.

In addition to expanding their breadth of knowledge, Air Force members assigned to peace operations can develop their depth of understanding in their particular field by assuming more responsibility than they might otherwise have. At Tuzla AB, junior officers held command positions that would be filled by an officer one or two grades senior at their home station. The Base Civil Engineer and the Contracting Officer were senior NCOs. Their experience in Bosnia will allow them to perform their jobs better upon returning to their bases, and will give them a better appreciation for what is required when they serve in leadership positions in the future.

Finally, there are many skills common to both peacekeeping and combat situations. These skills are practiced in peacekeeping training and are further exercised in a real-world environment. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report studying the effects of peace operations on readiness found that some Army leaders find such training to be useful:

According to 25th Infantry Division (L) officials, the Division Commander believed that incorporating some peace operations training in standard unit training can enhance combat skills and capabilities, since troops will likely encounter many of these tasks and conditions on complex future battlefields. Further, the Commander believes that by preparing for peace operations in advance, the Division can focus on more mission-specific requirements once tasked to respond to a peace operation.³²

The Commanding General of the First Marine Expeditionary Force told GAO analysts that standard training should address those aspects of peacekeeping that differ from traditional combat skills, and also that this training is not likely to negatively affect combat skills. According to the GAO report,

Incorporation of those aspects can be done, he believes, without degrading the combat capability of U.S. military forces and may in fact enhance combat capabilities, based on his past participation in peace operations.³³

These commanders appear confident that peace operations training will improve, rather than degrade, their units' skills.

MAINTAINING READINESS

There is a justifiable concern that participating in peacekeeping may reduce a force's combat effectiveness. The number of forces actively participating in peacekeeping at any given time tends to be but a tiny percentage of the force, but because of the long duration of these missions, the number of forces that will participate over time may be large. While the negative impact of peacekeeping operations is difficult to quantify, there is definitely a perception that such an impact exists.

Military commanders should take steps to eliminate or reduce negative effects from these operations.

Basic Skills Maintenance. One available method is the continuation of basic skills training (e.g., marksmanship) while participating in an operation. Brigadier General Stanley F. Cherrie, USA, comments on the methods for maintaining his forces' skills while part of Task Force Eagle:

I believe that continuing to train in conventional ways to the extent possible as we did with our tanks, Bradleys and dismounted rifle squads in Hungary, and our small arms in-country, helps reduce conventional warfighting "decay." This "on deployment" training helps to reduce the time it takes to get back into major theater warfighting fitness. After the 1st AD completes its training package, we will be able to assess about how long it takes to "come back" from PE [peace enforcement] to conventional readiness.³⁴

This sort of training is not always possible. The area may be too volatile, or the country in which the mission is taking place may not allow training facilities to be built. Given that peacekeeping missions employ the fewest people possible, there may not be time to remove personnel from operations to conduct training. Aircrews at Aviano AB, Italy, participating in Operation DELIBERATE GUARD, were flying one training sortie for every two operational sorties, giving them far less training time than they would normally receive.³⁵

Sometimes this training can be used to another advantage. Exercise DYNAMIC RESPONSE was not only an opportunity for forces in Bosnia to conduct joint training, but was also a show of force demonstrating SFOR's capabilities to all of the entities involved in the conflict. The effect of the exercise on the different entities, especially the demonstration of airpower's effectiveness, was sobering to say the least.³⁶

Basic skills training by itself does not keep forces combat ready. But if basic skills can be maintained, that is one thing that does not need

to be re-learned; post-operation training can then focus on skills that could not be exercised during the operation.

Post-Mission Refresher Training. Unit commanders must allow sufficient time for refresher training focusing on those abilities that have unavoidably been affected by the nature of a peacekeeping mission. This requires a training program to hone the skills necessary for a unit to be combat ready. In addition to sharpening skills, such training may also return individuals to a combat mindset that will be different from the restrained environment of a peacekeeping operation.

Commanders will need to evaluate the impact that the mission had on their essential tasks. This evaluation should be an on-going process from the time the unit begins preparing for deployment until it has returned home, so that training plans can be developed and implemented quickly. The staff at major training centers can help tailor retraining efforts to improve shortfalls identified during and after a deployment.³⁷

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The Air Force's involvement in peace operations will not diminish any time soon. As ethnic, religious, and nationalistic tensions around the world continue to brew and occasionally boil over, the United States will intervene where it sees it is in its interest to do so. Military forces will be expected to work in conjunction with political, economic, and social tools to limit conflicts and resolve them with as little violence as possible. So long as a preference exists for maintaining stability rather than fighting a war, there will be a demand for peace operations. Even when American ground forces do not participate, the Air Force is likely to provide air mobility or provide military observers in UN peace operations.

The lessons that airmen have learned should be reflected in operational doctrine, strategies, and policies. Though each peace operation will be different, experiences in the past have shown that some

concepts are relevant to peacekeeping in general. Doctrine, operation plans, force structure, personnel policies, and training and education should incorporate past experiences to improve future operations.

OPERATIONS

Air Force Doctrine for Peace Operations. The Air Force does not have specific doctrine for peace operations; because many Air Force missions in peacekeeping are similar to wartime missions, the development of a separate doctrine is not required. Peace operations make use of Air Force capabilities and functions such as Counterland, Counterair, Airlift, Air Mobility Support, Information Operations, and others. Doctrine for these functional areas already exists. What is needed in a peace operation is a strategy that effectively incorporates the appropriate application of Air Force and Joint doctrine. For instance, rather than a doctrine for peace operations that describes air mobility support, planners and educators should use air mobility support doctrine to prepare airmen for participation in peace operations. One advantage of the Air Force over land forces is that aerospace capabilities are used in much the same way during a peace operation as they would be during wartime. So long as airmen understand the unique requirements of peacekeeping and the objectives of such a mission, they should be able to apply the same skills.

Effective Use of Airpower. Airpower offers an extremely powerful arrow in a joint force commander's quiver. But there is a tendency at times to overuse the power of air in ways that are not appropriate for the situation. Coercive airpower (that is, threatening or employing lethal force from the air) has its place in peace operations; Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia demonstrated that well. The use of coercive airpower will be less in peacekeeping than in peace enforcement, and it will be used far less in both than in traditional combat. Peace support is accomplished through interaction more than through threats and combat, working *with* the entities rather than *against* them. That said, there will

always be a use for the power of air, so long as planners realize that power is not just the ability to put steel on target; it is the ability to use another dimension effectively and in a better fashion than a potential adversary.

Airpower offers a presence that is different from that provided by land forces. While aircraft may not always be as obvious as an observation post, the fact that they are available implies that they can respond quickly, carrying far more firepower than peacekeepers on the ground. When used in concert with surface forces, this “virtual presence” offers a quick response time, discreet monitoring, and the precise application of force. Airpower demonstrations, such as in Exercise DYNAMIC RESPONSE in Bosnia, can have a profound effect on the local inhabitants. Care must be taken, though, when introducing coercive airpower into an operation. It may be too much for a peacekeeping mission, leading to a lack of trust in the peacekeepers by the entities. The potential then exists for escalation of violence. Even in peace enforcement, care must be taken to keep the threat and application of force proportionate to the situation. Casualties must be minimized, and physical damage must be restricted to targets that will not delay the political resolution or economic development processes. Whether conducting a strategic attack against hostile military forces or providing close air support to peacekeepers on the ground, force from the air must be used in a proper balance, just as force from the surface must be.

Coercive airpower is best employed through a unified approach rather than through the selection of a single strategy. A coercive campaign will integrate aspects of

- *denial*: reducing or eliminating an adversary’s ability to resist;
- *punishment*: destroying those things the enemy values most;
- *risk*: short, measured attacks on high-value targets, followed by a pause for an adversary to reflect on what continuing conflict is likely to cost;

- *decapitation*: attacking leadership and command and control (C2) targets, perhaps including direct attacks against the leadership of an adversary organization.

The unified approach has historically been demonstrated to be more effective than trying to rely on a single approach.³⁸

Other capabilities of airpower offer more to a joint force commander than merely force application. The use of airpower to monitor activity on the ground and in the air provides a commander with a more complete picture of the situation at less risk to observers. Monitoring can be performed visually, photographically, or electronically, depending on the area of operations and the technology available to the entities. The use of air assets implies to the entities that all of their actions can be monitored without their realizing it. Airpower can also be used for command and control of ground and air forces, and tactical mobility offering a quick response for ground forces.

Air mobility is perhaps the most important contribution that airpower can make. Most of the positive effects of peace operations come through the interaction of forces with the local population and the stabilizing presence they provide. Air mobility ensures that these forces can be sustained during the long periods typically required for success in such operations. It also enables such critical requirements as aeromedical evacuation and rapid redeployment, if needed. It offers the best means for providing the humanitarian assistance, refugee resettlement, and economic reconstruction that are so important to the long-term peacebuilding effort. The true power of air is often embodied more by a C-130 than by an F-16.

De-escalation Strategy. A strategy of de-escalation offers reduced risk to peacekeepers and contributes the most to local stability and the ultimate political resolution of the situation. The concept involves introducing a greater amount of force at the beginning of an operation, securing the environment without destroying the legitimacy of the peace

force. This establishes the peacekeepers as a force to be reckoned with and should provide for immediate, short-term stability, allowing the introduction of the peacemaking and peacebuilding methods. Once the political and economic processes have developed their momentum, military forces can begin to move out, scaling back both air and surface power. This has been the case in Bosnia; the 20,000 troops comprising Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in 1995 were reduced to 6,900 by the time Operation JOINT FORGE was initiated in June 1998. Forces can be reintroduced if necessary without declaring the mission a failure, whereas a force that starts small and has to add power later is often viewed as one that is in trouble.³⁹ De-escalation offers an effective presence, immediate stability, and an orderly withdrawal of forces leading to normalization of the region.

Redeployment Planning. The National Military Strategy suggests that the military force structure is sufficient to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, provided that these forces disengage from smaller contingencies and redeploy to the larger conflicts. That redeployment, however, will be a very complicated exercise, coming as it does during the deployment of other forces from the CONUS to a crisis area. Another problem is that many of the forces required in the beginning of a crisis are also responsible for many of the redeployment activities. It is impossible to "what if" every possible scenario, but given that the military force structure is predicated on the ability to redeploy rapidly, it is essential that planners develop redeployment plans as part of their operation plan for a peace operation. This redeployment plan should be coordinated with other force providers and mobility providers, and should be modified as the deployment situation around the world changes. Priorities for redeployment should be identified, aerial ports to join inter- and intratheater airlift should be designated, and there should be some thought given to continuing to support the peacemaking and peacebuilding processes through other means.

Operational Support Requirements. Even though it may not be politically feasible to suggest that US forces will remain involved in a peace operation for a long period of time, the fact remains that these missions require a degree of perseverance that may not be found in other MOOTW or in warfare. As a result, operation plans should consider the need for appropriate basing and logistics support for the long term. Rather than introducing forces with the minimum support needed for operations, logistics planners should consider what will be required over time and implement such programs upon commencement of the operation. This not only obviates the need for incremental changes over time, but also demonstrates the commitment of the United States to remaining engaged until a political resolution can be found. This demonstration of resolve can provide a strong impetus for the peacemaking process. Support to forces must be sufficient to allow them to operate in the most effective manner possible. Maintaining the fiction of a short operation by providing forces with the barest support only reduces the effectiveness of those forces.

ORGANIZATION

Specialized Units. One of the debates raging with regard to peace operations concerns the designation of specialized units for such missions. This would have the advantage of allowing certain units to become expert peacekeepers, and allow other units to continue to focus on developing and retaining their combat skills. This option may hold some merit for ground forces whose tasks in peace operations are markedly different from those they would perform in warfare. However, Air Force forces typically perform the same duties in peacekeeping as they do in war. Combat air forces probably see the biggest difference, but they are called upon so rarely for this type of mission that the designation of special units would hardly be worthwhile. Even they find the same skills being employed, simply with less firepower and in a

lower threat environment. The designation of certain Air Force units for peace operations would lend little, if any, benefit to Air Force operations.

Force Structure. Planners and commanders must be careful to employ the right forces. Just as an Army commander might prefer infantry over armor in an urban environment, so might an Air Force commander prefer an AC-130 gunship over an F-16. Certain forces are appropriate for certain situations, and rather than merely employing all available assets, commanders should try to find the right mix of forces for the objectives and the threat.

One tenet of aerospace power is versatility; commanders should use it. Many airframes can perform more than a single mission. Rather than assigning one type of aircraft to CAS and another to air interdiction, commanders should designate the same aircraft for both missions when possible. Minimal military presence is best, and commanders should not employ a larger force than they need. Overwhelming power is not an asset in peace operations; restraint is.

Support forces are in high demand in contingencies around the world. Even in situations where combat airpower may not be employed, mobility air bases will often be operated by Air Force personnel on the ground. Planners should try to minimize the use of support forces by using pre-existing facilities when possible. Commanders should not demand support forces that are not required.

The Air Force has a number of aircraft considered high-demand, low-density (HDL). These include such things as AWACS, AC-130 gunships, and intelligence-gathering aircraft. Like support forces, these assets are in high demand around the world, and their operating tempo is significantly higher than for many others in the Air Force. While it may be useful to have these assets on call, commanders should determine if they really need them before requesting that they be added to the force structure. If the situation does not require them, if they would have limited effectiveness, or if the same result can be achieved using a more

readily available resource, then these HDLD assets should not be employed.

The ability to provide rapid power projection on a global basis is a key component of aerospace power. If forces need to be held in reserve, but will likely have warning before needed, commanders should consider basing them at home subject to recall rather than having them deployed. Forward basing means not only a strain on those crews but also an increase in required support and a comparable increase in the military presence and in potential targets.

PERSONNEL ISSUES

Rotation Policies. Joint doctrine for peace operations recommends deploying as a unit so that individuals functioning as a team will have trained with each other and will be familiar with each other.⁴⁰ This is one characteristic of the Army's involvement in Bosnia. The Army deployment is formed around a core of units that are deployed from the same division. Due in part to the logistical nightmare involved in moving such large units in and out of the AOR, they remain in place for months at a time. Most of the soldiers interviewed during the April 1998 visit expected to be deployed 6-9 months. This led to a greater impact on training and overall division readiness, increased the strain on families, and lowered morale. Among the advantages was the fact that individual soldiers could work alongside others with whom they had trained, and there was a greater sense of continuity throughout the unit's deployment. Given the nature of Army operations and the high degree of integration required between the different combat, combat support, and combat service support branches, this system of deployments and rotations seemed to work best for the Army, according to the officers interviewed.

There are times when it is best to deploy forces as a unit, though, and times when it is best to move individuals. The Air Force seems to have struck the appropriate balance between the two. Aircrews tend to rotate as units, which makes sense as they have trained together and are aware

of each other's capabilities. Support personnel who should deploy as a unit, such as Aerial Port personnel and Security Forces, tend to do so as well. For the majority of support forces, however, deploying as units provides little or no benefit, whereas individual rotations add to the deployed unit's ability to maintain its corporate knowledge while at the same time reducing the strain on home units.

Length of rotations is also an issue. The experience at Tuzla AB suggests that a 120-day rotation policy works very well. This allows individuals enough time to learn their job well and be able to learn new tasks as required. It also cuts down on the constant turnover that would be the case with a shorter rotation period. Finally, it reduces the strain and tension that would likely be more evident with a longer, 6-month rotation. Morale was very high on Tuzla AB, where 120 days was the norm, while it was much lower on the Army's Eagle Base, where most deployments ran 6-9 months. As one airman put it, "I can stand on my head for 120 days if I have to. But keep me here for 6 months, and I start to worry about my family." The highly motivated attitude that was observed within the 401st was likely to persist in part because many of the individuals were volunteers, another situation not possible under a system where entire units deploy.⁴¹

Six-month rotations would cut the number of people required by 1/3 every year. But, as the commander at Tuzla pointed out, that would also reduce the number of people in the Air Force gaining valuable real-world experience. The commander's 6-month tour seemed appropriate, as it allowed for greater continuity where it was most essential. The Vice Commander's 90-day rotation was also effective, as this position was held by an aircrew member, whose proficiency would deteriorate sharply if he remained out of the cockpit too long. Most aircrews were on 45-day rotations, which seemed to work because it allowed them to return to their home stations and regain the combat effectiveness lost by continuous patrols with limited training opportunities. Finally, the 120-

day rotation for most support forces led to an extremely competent and highly motivated unit. Current lengths and methods of personnel rotation seem to be the most effective possible. This factor should be considered as the Air Force determines how it will employ the "Air Expeditionary Force" concept it is currently developing.

One important issue that still needs to be resolved is the length of overlap between tours. This overlap permits the successor to follow around and learn his job directly from his predecessor, thus maximizing retention of corporate knowledge. The appropriate span depends on the complexity of the job and should be made on a case-by-case basis. The turnover within a unit should also be tracked and staggered so as to maintain a constant refresh rate and prevent the occasional mass turnover that effectively wipes corporate knowledge within that unit. These factors should be considered as the Air Expeditionary Force system is developed.

Making Use of Deployment Experience. Military members who have deployed often have a wealth of experience that can aid them in the performance of their daily duties at their home station, as well as in a combat environment. In many cases they have learned new means of accomplishing their primary tasks that may be more effective or efficient. They also may have learned new skills in a different field, perhaps to a level that would have seen them awarded a new specialty code had they completed a formal training program. The 401st EABG commander made a point of using squadron members with deployment experience at his home station when he was an Aerial Port Squadron commander. Often he would have these individuals conduct training sessions in the squadron in order to spread their experience to other members. He was also more likely to move members with deployment experience into leadership positions ahead of those without it.⁴²

The additional skills that members gain during a deployment could be very useful in later contingencies. Unfortunately, the Air Force has no

system for tracking such on-the-job training. Though it may be mentioned in an individual's letter of evaluation or performance report, there is really no way that they can be identified as possessing additional skills. Much as the Air Force evaluates and tracks foreign language ability, it should consider doing the same for additional skills and experience gained during contingency operations so that these capabilities may be effectively employed when needed in the future.

Use of Reserve Component Forces. The Air Force's use of individual, fairly short-term deployments would appear tailor-made for the employment of reserve component forces. At Tuzla AB, for instance, nearly every member of the Group deployed as an individual rather than as part of a standing unit. There was, however, very little use of Reservists or National Guard members. In fact, only the Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility (MASF) was staffed by Reservists and National Guardsmen, and that is only because the MASF is a reserve component mission. The only other Reservist on the base was the 401st EABG Commander, and the fact that he was able to perform so effectively demonstrates that Reservists could be well utilized.

Other units involved in the Bosnia operation relied heavily on the reserve component. Among the Army forces at Tuzla, nearly a third were Reservists and Guard members.⁴³ The CAOC at Vicenza had a number of Navy Reservists on 270-day rotations; in many cases, they served as the corporate knowledge in offices where most Americans were on 90-120 day rotations.⁴⁴ Reserve component members have commonly made up a significant percentage of the mobility and combat air forces deployed to peace operations. The experiences in Bosnia show that they can play an important role in leading, planning, and daily support operations as well.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

Training is the process of imparting knowledge and teaching specific skills required to accomplish tasks under defined conditions.⁴⁵ There are certain technical skills that are essential for a peacekeeping operation to be effective. While some tasks are unique to peacekeeping or are applied differently than in combat, airmen see much commonality between skills used in peacekeeping and in war and thus should require minimal training for peacekeeping. Planners working in air operations centers should participate in command and control exercises that improve their ability to develop an air campaign for a restrictive environment. Combat aircrews might benefit from training emphasizing restraint and precision, but even for them, very little unique training should be required. Preparation for specific operations should include mine awareness and rules of engagement training for the particular contingency.

Education is the process of imparting a body of knowledge to intellectually prepare individuals to deal with dynamic environments and solve ill-defined problems by using critical thought and reasoned judgment.⁴⁶ Certain educational disciplines can help military members develop the analytical and decision-making skills necessary in peacekeeping. Other types of knowledge will help forces apply their technical skills.

Education offers airmen a better understanding of national security issues and the military's role in them. It can help military members understand the nature of a conflict better, allowing them to develop better objectives and plan for accomplishing them with an eye toward the "big picture." Many at Tuzla remarked that the most useful portion of their SFOR training was the education about the history and culture of the region. It enabled them to see beyond their preconceived notions and understand some of the underlying conflict. They felt that it helped them interact better with local residents, and improved their morale because they understood their mission better.⁴⁷ Cultural education could help

airmen plan for and conduct operations more effectively because they would be better able to anticipate problems.

Students at all levels of military education should learn about the nature of peacekeeping and the proper application of Air Force doctrine in such operations. Professional military education programs throughout an airman's career should build upon one another, broadening student understanding at each level so they are prepared for the responsibilities they are likely to face.⁴⁸ This education process includes schools for enlisted members as well as for officers; the experience at Tuzla AB demonstrates that NCOs will often find themselves with a degree of responsibility comparable to that which an officer might typically have.

CONCLUSION

The United States is engaged in a number of peace operations that show no sign of ending any time soon, and there exists the potential for many other operations around the globe. Since the first UN peacekeeping mission in 1947, much has been learned about the best manner in which to conduct these operations. As the US and other countries continue to perform peace operations, there is still much to be learned about the most effective methods of participation. Whether the US military feels it should be performing these missions is an interesting item of debate, but the more important concern is that it possess the ability to carry out the missions it is assigned. Only by continuing to learn and refining strategies for peace operations can US military forces ensure they are prepared for whatever tasking awaits them.

ENDNOTES

¹ Using the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 as the dividing point, there have been 26 UN missions initiated after the Cold War as opposed to 23 during it. See the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations home page at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/>.

² Royal Army Field Manual 5, Part 2, *Wider Peacekeeping* (1994).

³ *JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Joint Warfighting Center, 1997), iii.

⁴ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," in *Perils of Anarchy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 208-248; Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," in *Perils of Anarchy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 249-286.

⁵ J. Martin Rochester, "The United Nations in a New World Order: Reviving the Theory and Practice of International Organization," in *Controversies in International Relations Theory* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1995), 199.

⁶ *JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, 2.

⁷ AFDD 2-3, *Military Operations Other Than War*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1996), 1-2.

⁸ Richard Gabriel, *Military Incompetence* (New York: Noonday Press, 1985), 131. Interviews with a number of other sources indicate that the Marine commander on the scene strongly urged that the strikes not take place because he feared escalation.

⁹ Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), provides an excellent discussion on facilitating effective interaction between civilian and military organizations.

¹⁰ Barry Blechman and J. Matthew Vacarro, *Training for Peacekeeping: The United Nations' Role* (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, July 1994), 11.

¹¹ Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations* (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), II-6 and II-8.

¹² Col Robert C. Owen, USAF, "The Balkan Air Campaign Study: Part I," *Airpower Journal* (Summer 1997): 9.

¹³ BACS Part I, 11.

¹⁴ Col Robert C. Owen, USAF, "The Balkan Air Campaign Study: Part II," *Airpower Journal* (Fall 1997): 11.

¹⁵ LtCol David J. Dean, USAF, *The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict* (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1986), 111.

¹⁶ BACS Part I, 7.

¹⁷ Maj Marc Dippold, USAF, "Air Occupation: Asking the Right Questions," *Airpower Journal* (Winter 1997): 73.

¹⁸ Interviews with CAOC C-5 personnel, April 1998.

¹⁹ An excellent discussion of the use of airpower in a low-intensity, urban operation may be found in Timothy L. Thomas, "Air Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict: The Case of Chechnya," *Airpower Journal* (Winter 1997): 51-59.

²⁰ As quoted in Thomas, "Air Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict: The Case of Chechnya," 51.

²¹ Interviews with US Military Observer Group -Washington personnel, 14 May 1997.

²² Interviews with 401st EABG personnel, April 1998.

²³ Interview with Bert Braun, Bosnian Desk Officer, US Department of State, May 1998.

²⁴ Interviews with CAOC C-5 personnel, April 1998.

²⁵ CPT Louis B. Rago, USA, "Putting the Tactical Back in the TOC," *Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter* (April 1998): 23.

²⁶ GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA, *National Military Strategy* (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997). Available via the World Wide Web at <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms>.

²⁷ United States General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability* (GAO/NSIAD-96-14, October 1995), 26. Army commanders generally estimate a 3-6 month period after a peace operation to fully restore a unit's warfighting readiness. Aviation units require less time than ground combat units, but some time is still required.

²⁸ United States General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts* (GAO/NSIAD-95-51, March 1995), 31.

²⁹ GAO, *Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts*, 42.

³⁰ Interviews with 401st EABG personnel, April 1998.

³¹ Interviews with CAOC personnel, April 1998.

³² GAO, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, 26.

³³ GAO, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, 21.

³⁴ Cherrie, 72.

³⁵ Interviews with CAOC personnel, April 1998.

³⁶ Interviews with CAOC C-5 personnel, April 1998.

³⁷ MAJ Ken Deal, USA, "Return to High-Intensity Conflict: Return to Basics," *Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter* (April 1998), 21.

³⁸ This concept of the unified approach was suggested by Maj Scott Walker, USAF, in "A Unified Field Theory of Coercive Airpower," *Airpower Journal* (Summer 1997): 76.

³⁹ An excellent discussion of de-escalation strategy may be found in Virginia Gamba and Jakkie Potgeiter, *Multifunctional Peace Support Functions: Evolution and Changes*, (Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies, January 1997), 34-36.

⁴⁰ Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-13.

⁴¹ Interviews with 401st EABG personnel, April 1998.

⁴² Interview with 401st EABG commander, April 1998.

⁴³ Interviews with Task Force Eagle personnel, April 1998.

⁴⁴ Interviews with CAOC personnel, April 1998.

⁴⁵ AFDD 2-4.3, *Education and Training* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, September 1998), 17.

⁴⁶ AFDD 2-4.3, 5.

⁴⁷ Interviews with 401st EABG personnel. The authors were also required to complete SFOR training prior to entering Bosnia, and concurred with the interviewees.

⁴⁸ AFDD 2-4.3, 11.

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